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Supported non-root Bubblewrap isolation inside Railway Sandboxes?
thomashood7
OP

a month ago

We are preparing CodeXile, a code-repair API, on Railway Pro and want to keep both the API and execution worker on Railway if it can meet our security requirements. Our synthetic worker acceptance test failed before any sandboxed command started. Could you confirm whether non-root Bubblewrap namespaces are supported in Railway Sandbox VMs and, if so, the supported configuration?

We have read the employee response at https://station.railway.com/questions/railway-sandbox-security-review-for-untr-62c5ced5 stating that there is no platform egress-deny option. Our specific remaining question is whether a supported guest-level isolation mechanism can enforce filesystem, process and network restrictions without disabling host protections or granting privileges to customer code.

Test details

  • Project: Codexile Staging, 8205c728-2d5c-4afc-a644-17a6a1d06b30.
  • Environment: staging, 30334575-9603-4344-983e-380d9701655d.
  • Diagnostic sandbox: 68bd28b4-e336-4af0-995a-882ce526154a, us-west2.
  • Created 9 October 2026 at 17:00:20 UTC. The run lasted about 39 seconds and the VM was destroyed; no failing VM remains running.
  • Requested 2 vCPU / 2 GB, ISOLATED networking, one-minute idle timeout, no domains, empty injected variables.
  • Standard sandbox image; Linux 6.18.46-railway x86_64, Node v24.21.0, Bubblewrap 0.11.1.
  • Tests ran as a dedicated non-root account. The launcher requests user, network, PID and IPC namespaces, drops guest capabilities, and mounts a limited filesystem.
  • Exact error from the guest-start checks: bwrap: No permissions to create a new namespace.
  • Setup and hash-verified file transfer succeeded. Both asynchronous and synchronous execution failed at guest startup. No code-execution containment pass was claimed.
  • We did not change namespace/AppArmor/sysctl policies, install a privileged helper, or enable process-only fallback. No customer code or credentials were used.

Does this kernel/runtime support the needed user, mount, PID and network namespaces for non-root processes? If the expected answer is yes, what supported setup are we missing? If it is no, is there a supported alternative that enforces these restrictions inside a Sandbox VM?

The error alone does not identify whether the restriction comes from kernel configuration, AppArmor, another policy or the runtime. We are asking for platform compatibility guidance, not changes to our account or application. Please do not provision, modify or delete resources.

The AI assistant first recommended this support request after inspecting our failed test, the published API options and your existing network-isolation answer. We want to avoid spending on another unchanged experiment. We understand Sandboxes remain beta; this request is for a restricted testnet evaluation, not production approval.

Prepared with Railway's support template (v1).

$20 Bounty

1 Reply

Status changed to Awaiting Railway Response Railway • about 1 month ago


Railway
BOT

a month ago

This is the kind of problem the Railway community is well placed to help with, so we'd like to open your thread as a community bounty. Railway pays a bounty to the community member who solves it, and threads like this usually get picked up quickly.

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Status changed to Awaiting User Response Railway • about 1 month ago


Railway
BOT

a month ago

This thread has been opened as a public bounty so the community can help solve it. The thread and any further activity are now visible to everyone.

Status changed to Open Railway • about 1 month ago


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