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Trusted HTTPS ingress and prevention of direct/private bypass
Anonymous
OP

21 days ago

Can a Railway public HTTP service enforce at the application's externally listening socket that every accepted request arrived through Railway's TLS-terminating edge, excluding direct/public TCP and other same-environment service paths, AND let the application authenticate that fact using a documented stable peer identity or a platform-authenticated assertion unavailable to tenants/callers, with documented forwarding-header overwrite/sanitization? Please identify the exact supported enforcement configuration and guarantee covering alternate paths—not merely that the edge emits X-Forwarded-Proto:https. If no such mechanism exists, please explicitly confirm.

Solved

1 Reply

Railway
BOT

21 days ago

No, we don't offer that mechanism. There's no setting that makes your listening port accept traffic only from our HTTP edge, no stable published address range for the proxy your socket sees, and no mTLS identity or signed header your app can check to prove a request came through the edge.

Here is what we do guarantee. Our HTTP edge, including .up.railway.app domains, overwrites X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host and replaces any values the caller sent. That only applies to traffic that goes through the edge. Other services in the same project and environment can reach your port directly over private networking and send whatever forwarding headers they like. Traffic through a TCP proxy is passed through as raw bytes and its headers are not cleaned either.

Private networks are isolated between projects and environments, so each environment is its own trust boundary. If your app trusts forwarding headers from its immediate peer, it is trusting every service in that environment and any TCP proxy you expose. The peer addresses you might see, such as 100.64.0.0/10, can change and shouldn't be used as a trusted-proxy allowlist. Public TLS ends at our edge, and the hop from the edge to your app runs over an encrypted WireGuard tunnel. Encrypting that hop doesn't prove where a request came from.


Status changed to Awaiting User Response Railway • 21 days ago


Railway
BOT

14 days ago

This thread has been marked as solved automatically due to a lack of recent activity. Please re-open this thread or create a new one if you require further assistance. Thank you!

Status changed to Solved Railway • 14 days ago


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